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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This appeal is properly within the jurisdiction of the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED 
TO REBUT THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL PRESUMPTION? 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE TESTIMONY OF 
THE WITNESSES? 
III. CAN THE COURT OF APPEALS ALTERNATIVELY AFFIRM THE 
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT DEFENDANT 
MET THE TERMS OF ANY IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT WITH 
PLAINTIFF? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's findings 
of fact underlying an order to dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(b) for clear error, according "great weight to the 
findings made and the inferences drawn by the trial judge." 
Southern Title Guaranty Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 954, (Utah 
App. 1988); accord Handy v. Union Pacific R. Co., 841 P.2d 1210, 
1215 (Utah App. 1992). The trial court's findings are clearly 
erroneous only if they are against the great weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that the trial court has erred. Southern Title Guaranty 
Co. , 761 P.2d at 954. The Court reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness. Id. The existence of an 
implied-in-fact contract of employment and adherence thereto is a 
factual question. Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., 201 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah 1992). 
Rule 41(b) commits the weighing of the evidence to the 
discretion of the trial judge. The Court of Appeals reviews 
credibility and weight determinations for an abuse of that 
discretion. It is within the exclusive province of the trial court 
to decide "whether a witness is believable and [to] determin[e] 
what weight to assign a witness's testimony." Lemon v. Coates. 735 
P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987); see also Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping 
Co. , 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985) (purpose of Rule 41 is to permit 
the judge to weigh the evidence and draw inferences therefrom). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of the dismissal of plaintiff's case 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff Kelly Sorenson brought suit in the Third District Court 
alleging wrongful termination in violation of an implied contract 
of employment. Sorenson contends that he was entitled to, and 
subsequently denied, notice of his deficient job performance, and 
application of progressive discipline prior to his termination. 
The trial court found that Sorenson was an at-will employee and 
could be terminated for any reason. Notwithstanding, Sorenson 
received substantial notice of his deficient performance and was 
granted significant opportunities to improve his performance and 
retain his employment. 
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Sorenson filed his complaint in the Third District Court 
on September 18, 19 89. After a year of discovery, defendant 
Kennecott brought a Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court 
denied Kennecott's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted 
Sorenson's motion to amend his Complaint. A trial was conducted 
before Judge Scott Daniels on January 27 through January 30, 1992. 
Sorenson testified extensively in his own behalf, and also 
introduced the testimony of three former Kennecott employees. 
Stewart Smith testified by videotape deposition, shown at trial. 
After Sorenson concluded the presentation of his case, Kennecott 
sought a dismissal under Rule 41(b). The district court heard 
arguments on Kennecott's motion on March 12, 1992, and the court 
granted Kennecott's motion and dismissed Sorenson's Amended 
Complaint on April 2, 1992. 
In granting Kennecott's motion to dismiss, the trial 
court found that Kennecott's progressive discipline practices were 
required by the Collective Bargaining Agreement for union-
represented employees. In contrast, progressive discipline was not 
applied to supervisory employees as a matter of contract. Rather 
it was applied in an informal manner and as a matter of good 
management. The court found that Sorenson failed to demonstrate 
the existence of any implied contract between Kennecott and himself 
for continued employment, and found that Sorenson, as a supervisory 
employee, was not entitled to progressive discipline as a matter of 
contract. 
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FACTUAL HISTORY 
Kennecott hired Sorenson on March 18, 1974, as an entry-
level metallurgical engineer in the operations group at its smelter 
facility. (T. pp. 50, 59. )1 Sorenson remained in the operations 
group until 1987, where he held several titles, the last being that 
of material handling general foreman. He held this title from 1984 
to 19 87, which included a period during which the smelter was in a 
shutdown mode. (T. pp. 72, 367-368.) During this period of time 
Dallas Mikich, operations superintendent, was Sorenson's direct 
supervisor.2 (T. pp. 68, 366.) In June 1987, after the start-up 
of the smelter, Sorenson was transferred from the operations group 
to the smelter technical group, reporting to David George, 
technical superintendent. (T. pp. 370-371.) As part of this 
transfer, Sorenson received a two-level grade reduction and was 
demoted to metallurgical engineer, a title he retained until his 
transfer to the Bonneville concentrator facility in July 1988. (T. 
pp. 369, 373.) David George remained his supervisor during this 
entire time from July 1987 through July 1988. As a member of the 
technical group, Sorenson provided technical support for the start-
up of the smelter. (T. p. 370.) In that capacity Sorenson was 
1
 References to the trial transcript are abbreviated "T." 
followed by the appropriate page number. References to the 
deposition of Stewart Smith, video taped and presented at trial, 
are indicated as "(Stewart depo. p. .) " References to the Kelly 
Sorenson deposition, published at trial, are abbreviated "(Sorenson 
depo. p. . ) " Trial exhibits are abbreviated "Ex. ." 
2
 There were four groups at the smelter: operations, 
maintenance, technical, and by-products, each with their own 
superintendent who in turn reported to the smelter manager. 
(T. p. 370). 
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assigned in July 19 87 to provide support to the anode plant, where 
he remained until November 1987, when he was given the assignment 
of coordinating the start-up of the filter plant. (T. pp. 77, 373, 
375, 377, 380.) Sorenson remained in the filter plant until he was 
transferred to the Bonneville concentrator in July 1988. Sorenson 
worked at the Bonneville concentrator until his employment was 
terminated on January 31, 1989. (T. p. 50.) 
In attempting to establish an implied-in-fact contract of 
employment between Kennecott and himself, Sorenson relied 
principally upon a 1973 edition of the general code of conduct 
which he signed 1974 when he accepted employment with Kennecott. 
Sorenson particularly relies on the fourth paragraph of the 
foreword to the 1973 edition of the general rules of conduct, which 
states: 
Violation of these rules is cause for either 
(1) written warning, or (2) suspension subject 
to hearing for discipline purposes. Such a 
hearing can result in penalty, lay-off or 
discharge, depending upon the seriousness of 
the offense. 
(T. pp. 387-88; Ex. 1.) Sorenson also cites oral representations 
made to him by Charlie Bird and Gene Bryant at the time he was 
hired. (T. pp. 54, 57.) Bird and Bryant each merely reiterated 
the provisions of the rules of conduct. (T. pp. 54, 57-58.) These 
rules of conduct were in effect until April 4, 1974, when they were 
succeeded by a replacement code of conduct. (T. pp. 383-84; Ex. 
154.) The 1974 code did not contain any language similar to the 
paragraph relied upon by Sorenson, and explicitly stated that it 
superseded all prior codes of conduct and disciplinary rules. The 
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1974 code was, in turn, replaced by a new set of general rules of 
conduct issued in 1977. (T. p. 384; Ex. 155.) Those rules were 
once again superseded by rules issued in 1980. (T. p. 385; Ex. 
156.) Successor general codes of conduct were issued in 1984 and 
1986. (T. pp. 385-87; Ex. 157, 158.) Without exception, each of 
these subsequent documents expressly stated that it superseded and 
replaced any and all previously issued rules of conduct. (T. p. 
389.) Also without exception, none of these documents contained 
any language similar to that relied upon by Sorenson in the 19 73 
General Rules of Conduct, now five times succeeded, in effect at 
the time Sorenson accepted employment at Kennecott. (T. p. 388.) 
Sorenson also places great weight on the course content 
of several management training seminars which he attended during 
his tenure at Kennecott. Sorenson's first management training 
seminar was held approximately six weeks after he began employment 
with Kennecott in 1974. (T. p. 113.) Progressive discipline was 
presented as including verbal warnings, written warnings, 
suspension, and hearings as precedents to termination. (T. p. 
119.) The seminar included detailed discussions of dovetailing 
progressive discipline with the provisions of the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement for hourly workers. (T. pp. 114-15.) 
Sorenson testified that none of the facilitators of this 
presentation distinctively excluded salaried (or supervisory) 
employees from their discussions of corrective or progressive 
discipline. (T. p. 115.) From this absence of exclusion, Sorenson 
formed a subjective belief that all of the provisions of 
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progressive discipline applied to him, (T. pp. 120, 122-23.) 
Later in the same year Sorenson attended another seminar where 
progressive discipline was "briefly touched on" and the discussions 
"did not contradict" Sorenson's subjective understanding of the 
application of progressive discipline. (T. p. 116.) Again, 
Sorenson relies on the fact that no one issued a disclaimer that 
the discussions of the mechanics of progressive discipline applied 
only to union employees and not to salaried employees. (T. 
p. 117.) 
Sorenson next attended two management training sessions 
in the early 1980s, one at which corrective discipline principles 
were illustrated through a pre-packaged video tape presentation 
that Kennecott had purchased (Zenger-Miller course). (T. p. 121.) 
Sorenson recalled that one of the Zenger-Miller video tapes 
depicted supervisors addressing both supervisors and hourly 
employees concerning the correction of behavioral problems but 
provided no detail as to the content of those tapes. (T. p. 122.) 
Sorenson also testified he also attended a management training 
seminar sometime in 1983 or 1984 which was almost identical in 
content to the initial training program he attended in the early 
1980's. (T. pp. 123, 125.) Once again, Sorenson testified that 
none of the instructors specifically articulated that their 
comments were strictly limited to employees covered under the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement. (T. p. 125.) 
In the last training program he attended, Sorenson was a 
facilitator. This program was known as the Fresh Start program, a 
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program for Kennecott employees returning to work in 1986 after the 
shutdown of Kennecott Utah Copper. It emphasized team spirit and 
Kennecott's "fresh start". (T. pp. 128-30, 513; Ex. 143.) No one 
at that program said salaried employees were entitled to a 
progression of discipline which included verbal and written 
warnings, and suspension prior to termination. (T. pp. 396-97.) 
Sorenson also relies on a manual distributed in connection with a 
19 88 management seminar which he did not attend, despite the fact 
that his initial testimony detailed his attendance at that seminar. 
(Sorenson depo. pp. 32-39; T. pp. 398-411). 
Sorenson also relies upon the discipline of approximately 
twelve supervisors during his fifteen year tenure at Kennecott to 
support his belief that he was subject to progressive discipline 
requirements (Sorenson had personal knowledge of only seven). 
Sorenson contends that various elements of progressive discipline 
were applied to these twelve supervisors, and therefore established 
a course of conduct requiring Kennecott to apply progressive 
discipline to him. Notwithstanding, Sorenson testified that 
disciplinary measures for supervisors had to be dealt with in "new 
creative ways." Sorenson stated that with one supervisor, they 
"hit upon an idea" for discipline, implying that the various 
training seminars did not address the discipline of supervisory 
employees. 
Sorenson's performance resulted in a two-grade demotion 
in June of 1987. (T. p. 3 69.) Sorenson's performance continued to 
be questionable during 1987. For example, after being dispatched 
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to Chile in December to acquire information to assist Kennecott in 
troubleshooting its Utah operations, Sorenson failed to report his 
evaluation to his supervisor, David George, until ten days after 
his return. (T. pp. 90, 94.) This failure to timely report 
prompted David George, Sorenson7s supervisor, to write a letter to 
Sorenson detailing his performance deficiencies. (T. p. 449.) In 
his 19 87 annual performance review, which he received in February 
1988, Sorenson received a G- (below average) performance rating, 
reflecting his substandard job performance. (T. p. 448.) Although 
both Sorenson and Jerry Hansen,3 on Sorenson7s behalf, challenged 
this rating, Stewart Smith, the smelter plant manager, would not 
agree to alter the rating. (T. p. 576.) Smith also testified 
about Sorenson7s deficiencies. He testified that Sorenson7s 
coordination of the start-up of the anode casting plant did not go 
"particularly well." (Smith depo. p. 17.) Sorenson failed to 
execute "numerous plans of action" or executed action plans 
improperly. (Smith depo. pp. 18-19.) Smith discussed Sorenson7s 
management deficiencies with him and ultimately directed that 
Sorenson be removed from the anode plant for "inadequate 
performance." (Smith depo. pp. 19, 21.) 
3
 Jerry Hansen was the operations superintendent. Both George 
and Hansen reported to Stewart Smith, smelter manager. (T. p. 370; 
Smith depo. pp. 15, 20.) Jerry Hansen was maintenance superin-
tendent from 1977 to January 1, 1987 (T. p. 86) ; acting plant 
manager from January 1, 1987 to June 19 87, the period immediately 
preceding the smelter start-up; operations superintendent from July 
1987 to August 19 88; and manager of engineer projects from August 
1988 to September 1989 when he left Kennecott. (T. p. 485-486.) 
Hansen became the operations superintendent at the same time 
Sorenson was transferred from the operations group to the technical 
group. 
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Smith testified that he would not have continued to 
employ Sorenson at the smelter because Sorenson had had "ample 
opportunity to mend his ways." (Smith depo. p. 23.) Despite 
Sorenson7s performance failures, Kennecott gave Sorenson the 
opportunity to transfer to the Bonneville concentrator. (Smith 
depo. p. 22.) When Sorenson failed to report to work at the 
Bonneville concentrator as scheduled, Smith called Sorenson into 
his office and advised him "this may be [your] last chance and 
[you] should get over there [to the concentrator] post-haste." 
(Smith depo. p. 22.) Smith continued, telling Sorenson that "this 
is an opportunity where you can redeem yourself. I suggest you get 
over there and give it your best shot." (Smith depo. p. 28.) 
Sorenson transferred to the Bonneville concentrator in 
July 19 88 as the operations general foreman. Senior managers Rod 
Davey and Bill Strickland toured the concentrator plant in December 
1988. (T. pp. 298-307.) Sorenson conceded they appeared 
displeased with the condition of the plant. (T. p. 307.) 
Subsequently, Gary Jungenburg, Sorenson's immediate supervisor, 
told Sorenson that Davey and Strickland were not happy with the 
condition of the concentrator and wanted a cleanup schedule. (T. 
pp. 316-17.) Sorenson expressed his recognition of these problems 
in memoranda to Gary Jungenburg detailing cleanup schedules for 
equipment in the secondary crushing area. (T. pp. 319-20; Ex. 17.) 
Sorenson and Jungenburg had ongoing conversations during this 
period concerning the condition of the Bonneville concentrator and 
the necessity for immediate action. (T. p. 326.) In January, 
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Sorenson had a similar conversation with Chris Robison, 
Jungenburg's successor and Sorenson's new supervisor. (T. pp. 325-
29.) Shortly before his termination Robison told Sorenson that the 
condition of the Bonneville concentrator was likely to cause "some 
people [to] lose their jobs," although there was no direct 
reference to Sorenson. (T. p. 330.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Kennecott did not hire Sorenson for any definite period 
of time and he is therefore presumed to be an at-will employee. 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1040 (Utah 1989). 
The trial court properly found that Sorenson did not rebut the 
presumption of at-will employment because Sorenson could not meet 
the standard articulated in Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 
P.2d 997 (Utah 1991) . Under Johnson, an employee must show that he 
reasonably believed his at-will status was altered by a suffi-
ciently definite communication that the employer intended to create 
an employment relationship other than employment at-will. Johnson, 
818 P.2d at 1002. Sorenson relied on the preface of an out-dated 
and superseded code of conduct, as well as subsequent communica-
tions in management training classes and Kennecott's course of 
conduct, in his attempt to show that he had an implied-in-fact 
contract for continued employment. None of these factors factually 
supported an implied contract. 
The trial court implicitly discounted witness testimony 
concerning Sorenson7s contractual entitlement to progressive 
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discipline. Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
the trial judge to determine witness credibility and to assess the 
proper weight to assign to testimony. Sorenson's credibility was 
demonstrably diminished by self-conflicting testimony. Jerry 
Hansen, Sorenson's secondary witness, testified about progressive 
discipline in vague terms, and had little actual supervisory 
responsibility over Sorenson. Finally, both witnesses were sharply 
contradicted by Stewart Smith, a witness fired by Kennecott. 
Even if the Court holds that the trial court's factual 
finding that there was no implied contract is clearly erroneous, 
the Court should alternatively affirm the trial court's judgment on 
the grounds that Kennecott provided Sorenson notice prior to 
termination. Sorenson received a series of communications, such as 
a performance evaluation, letter from his supervisor, and memoranda 
regarding his area of responsibility. In addition, Sorenson's 
supervisors counseled with him and advised him to improve his 
performance. Sorenson was not entitled to a rigid succession of 
disciplinary measures. He received adequate notice that Kennecott 
viewed his performance as unsatisfactory, and ultimately 
unacceptable. 
12 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
FAILED TO SUCCESSFULLY REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF 
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL. 
A. Because Sorenson was Hired for an 
Indefinite Period of Time# His 
Employment was Terminable at Will. 
When an employee is hired for an indefinite period of 
time, the law presumes that the employment relationship is 
terminable at-will, i.e., that it may be terminated by either the 
employee or the employer at any time and for any reason. Berube, 
771 P.2d at 1040-41, 1044. Sorenson had no employment contract 
with Kennecott for a definite period of time such as one or two or 
twenty years; he was employed for an indefinite period. (T. p. 
359.) Accordingly, a presumption arises that his employment was 
terminable at-will by himself or by Kennecott. Brehany v. 
Nordstrom, Inc.. 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991); Berube, 771 P.2d at 
1044. The trial court ruled that Sorenson's implied contract claim 
failed because he could not overcome this presumption that his 
employment was terminable at-will. 
The trial court found that Kennecott's disciplinary 
practices with salaried employees were "never part of a contract." 
Sorenson v. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp., Order and Judgment of 
Dismissal, No. 89-0905608 at 2 (3rd Dist. Ct., Apr. 2, 1992). The 
presumption of at-will employment may be overcome where "an 
employer's internally adopted policies and procedures concerning 
discharge . . . purport to establish limitations on the employer's 
right to discharge." Caldwell v. Ford Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 
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777 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989); Brehany, 812 P.2d at 55. An implied 
employment contract, whether based on a written document, such as 
the 1973 General Rules of Conduct, or the employer's course of 
conduct with its employees, may establish implied terms of 
employment only if the policy statement or custom relied on clearly 
indicates that the employer has relinquished its "unfettered right 
to discharge its employees." Brehany. 812 P.2d at 54-56. 
In Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. Inc., the Utah Supreme 
Court held that in determining whether an employer has 
contractually limited its right to terminate at will the intent of 
the employer is controlling. Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002. 
Therefore, for there to be an implied employment contract that 
overcomes the presumption of at-will employment, the plaintiff must 
establish that the employer "intended to modify the employment 
relationship to provide that an employee could be terminated only 
for good cause." Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1003. 
The Johnson court articulated the employee's burden as 
showing that the employer manifested its intent to contract on 
other than at-will basis. 
[F]or an implied-in-fact contract to exist, it 
must meet the requirements for an offer of a 
unilateral contract. There must be a 
manifestation of the employer's intent that is 
communicated to the employee and sufficiently 
definite to operate as a contract provision. 
Furthermore, the manifestation of the 
employer's intent must be of such a nature 
that the employee can reasonably believe that 
the employer is making an offer of employment 
other than employment at-will. 
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Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002 (citations omitted). Thus, no contract 
is formed if the employer communicates its intention in such a way 
that an employee could not reasonably believe that his or her 
employment is other than at-will. 
The Johnson court also emphasized that an employer is 
free to change or abolish the terms of the unilateral contract by 
offering superseding or different terms. "The unilateral nature of 
such an employment contract is important because it affects the 
flexibility of the employment relationship." Johnson, 818 P.2d at 
1002. 
In the case of a unilateral contract for 
employment, where an at-will employee retains 
employment with knowledge of new or changed 
conditions, the new or changed conditions may 
become contractual obligations. In this 
manner, an original employment contract may be 
modified or replaced by a subsequent 
unilateral contract. The employee's retention 
of employment constitutes acceptance of the 
offer of a unilateral contract; by continuing 
to stay on the job although free to leave, the 
employment supplies the necessary 
consideration for the offer. 
Id. (quoting Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 
(Minn. 1983)). See also Brehany, 812 P.2d at 56 n.2 ("the 
continued rendering of services by an employee is 
consideration that supports the binding effect of the terms. The 
employer may, however, change those terms or even abolish them"). 
B. The Trial Court Properly Found That 
Kennecott's Code of Conduct Did Not 
Support an Implied-in-fact Contract 
for Continued Employment. 
The trial court found that the 1973 General Rules of 
Conduct did not support an implied-in-fact employment contract. 
Even though the General Rules of Conduct were superseded by five 
subsequent documents, Sorenson relies exclusively on a single 
paragraph in the preface, which paragraph finds no home in any of 
the subsequent documents. Sorenson ignores the fact that each of 
the subsequent codes of conduct contain explicit and unequivocal 
declarations that all prior codes were superseded. Thus, under 
Johnson, the language relied upon by Sorenson is of no effect. 
Applying the unilateral contract principles articulated in Johnson, 
a number of courts have held, as a matter of law, that an 
employer's new employment terms offered to an employee supersede 
prior unilateral contract terms. For example, in Bedow v. Valley 
National Bank, 5 I.E.R. Cases 1678 (D. Ariz. 1988), the court held 
that a personnel manual containing an at-will disclaimer, which was 
in effect at the time of plaintiff's termination, was controlling. 
The court stated: 
Any other conclusion would create chaos for 
employers who would have different contracts 
for different employees depending upon the 
particular personnel manual in force when the 
employee was hired. 
Id. at 1680. See also Ferrer v. Nielsen, 799 P.2d 458, 460 (Colo. 
App. 1990) (summary judgment affirmed where court applied 1986 
provisions rather than 1982 provisions to defeat discharged 
employee's implied contract claims); Castialione v. Johns Hopkins 
Hospital, 517 A.2d 786, 790, n.4 (Md. App. 1986) (by continuing to 
work for hospital after new manual distribution, discharged 
employee, by her conduct, impliedly assented to modification of 
employment agreement). The trial court properly discounted the 
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1973 General Rules of Conduct as supporting an implied-in-fact 
contract for employment because the Rules were subsequently 
superseded. 
In sum, Johnson stands for the proposition that an 
implied employment contract, if indeed one exists, is a unilateral 
contract that an employer may alter or terminate by providing new 
terms or conditions. Therefore, under Johnson, the trial court 
properly dismissed plaintiff's implied contract claim on the 
grounds that the 1973 General Rules of Conduct did not give rise to 
an implied contract term. 
C* The Trial Court Properly Found that 
Kennecott's Course of Conduct in 
Practicing Progressive Discipline 
was Not a Part of Any Contract. 
The Utah Supreme Court has never held that an employer's 
course of conduct or oral statements, standing alone, creates an 
implied-in-fact contract for continued employment, Hodgson v. 
Bunzl Utah, Inc., 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 23 (Utah 1992) . However, 
the respective conduct of an employer and employee may constitute 
evidence of an employer's intent to alter the at-will employment 
relationship. Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action Program, 
775 P.2d 940, 942 (Utah App. 1989) . The supreme court has recently 
held that "in order for an employer's conduct to create an implied-
in-fact contract modifying at-will employment, the conduct must 
meet the standards of a unilateral offer and acceptance." Hodgson, 
202 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24 (citing Johnson, 818 P.2d at 1002). 
Sorenson testified that his opinion regarding Kennecott's 
course of conduct was developed from his familiarity with 
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circumstances involving seven non-union employees who were 
subjected to some form or facet of progressive discipline, during 
his fifteen year tenure. (T. p. 151.) Jerry Hansen and Tracy 
Johnson also related their knowledge of five other disciplinary 
situations involving supervisors. (T. pp. 551-59, 640-41, 646-47.) 
While Sorenson testified that several of those employees received 
verbal and/or written warnings, Sorenson was able to identify only 
one employee who had received a disciplinary hearing and only one 
instance when suspension was used in the course of progressive 
discipline. (T. p. 564.) With respect to this instance, Sorenson 
testified that two discussions among the smelter plant manager and 
various foremen preceded the decision to suspend this particular 
employee. (T. p. 430.) The group struggled with the appropriate 
course of action in an attempt to "determine our next step, " and to 
find a solution "short of termination." (T. pp. 429-3 0.) They 
were "looking for a creative way to handle the problem, " and 
expressed concern that if suspension was used without a 
corresponding pay reduction that suspension for salaried employees 
would be viewed as a desired break rather than a punitive or 
corrective action. (T. pp. 431-32.) No one in attendance was 
aware of any instance in which a supervisor had ever been 
suspended. (T. p. 436.) Significantly, these discussions occurred 
after most of the training sessions Sorenson relies on to establish 
that progressive discipline -- consisting of a progression from 
verbal to written warnings, then to suspension -- was clearly 
applicable to supervisory personnel. See section D, below. 
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Stewart Smith testified that suspension was definitely not part of 
a defined supervisory disciplinary scheme during his tenure with 
Kennecott. (Smith depo. p. 46.) And, in fifteen years, acting in 
his supervisory capacity, Sorenson never utilized rigid steps of 
progressive discipline for those employees under his supervision. 
(T. pp. 438-39.) Although on occasion he counseled supervisors 
about performance problems, he never issued any written performance 
notices to any of his salaried employees nor suspended anyone. (T. 
p. 438.) 
Significantly, each of the witnesses Sorenson relies on, 
as well as Sorenson himself, were either terminated by Kennecott or 
received a demotion. Sorenson testified that he was given a double 
grade demotion in 1987, but there is no testimony that the demotion 
was preceded by any form of notice or discipline. Jerry Hansen, a 
critical witness for Sorenson's course of conduct theory, was 
demoted from a high level management position and assigned as an 
engineer. (Smith depo. p. 27.) Yet Hansen did not claim to have 
received notice prior to removal. Tracy Johnson, another of 
Sorenson's witnesses, had been reassigned because of performance 
deficiencies and was ultimately terminated from employment without 
prior notice or discipline. (T. pp. 644, 649-50.) Finally, 
Stewart Smith, Sorenson's last witness, was similarly fired by 
Kennecott, without a stated reason and without prior notice. 
(Smith depo. p. 44.) Smith, having been fired, testified that 
there was no company policy regarding discipline of supervisors. 
(Smith depo. at 46.) 
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Sorenson attempted to show the trial court a pattern of 
progressive discipline based upon his knowledge of seven isolated 
and distinct incidents, spread over the course of fifteen years, 
and handled distinctively as the circumstances required. In 
Hodgson, the plaintiff argued that the employer's course of conduct 
in disciplining other employees created an expectation that she 
would receive disciplinary warnings prior to termination. Hodgson, 
202 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. The plaintiff produced evidence of four 
episodes of employee discipline in two years, resulting in two 
written warnings and two oral warnings as well as the imposition of 
probationary periods. The probationary periods varied from ninety 
days to an unspecified period, and no written policy dictated the 
length of probation for any specific offense. The court held that 
this pattern of employee discipline did not meet the standard for 
creating an implied-in-fact contract modifying the at-will 
employment relationship. The court stated that the disciplinary 
sanctions meted out to the employees were not "sufficiently 
definite to constitute a contract term because they were too 
inconsistent." Hodgson, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. 
Sorenson's testimony of his view of Kennecott's course of 
conduct is not unlike the situation before the court in Hodgson. 
Indeed, Sorenson's own testimony demonstrated that Kennecott 
managers were uncertain as to how to proceed with a salaried 
employee who might require discipline. Sorenson, Hansen, Johnson 
and Stewart had first hand experience with Kennecott's course of 
conduct, and knew that demotions or other actions might come 
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without prior communication from Kennecott. It is this same 
uncertainty that mandates the result reached by the trial court. 
Under the standard of Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. Inc., the 
employer's conduct must be sufficiently definite and consistent to 
act as a contract provision. Johnson, 818 P. 2d at 1002. 
Kennecott's individual attention and reaction to the performance 
difficulties of a relative few salaried employees over the course 
of fifteen years simply did not meet this standard. Faced with 
this weak evidence, and confronted with conflicting evidence of 
Kennecott's course of conduct presented by Sorenson himself, the 
trial court did not err in finding that Kennecott's course of 
conduct does not support an implied-in-fact contract for continued 
employment. 
D. Kennecott's Management Training 
Programs do not Support an Implied-
in-fact Contract for Continued 
Employment. 
Neither Sorenson's subjective impressions following 
discussions with his own superiors nor the concepts taught in 
Kennecott's management training seminars support a finding that 
Kennecott intended to alter the at-will employment status of its 
salaried employees. Sorenson participated in six management 
training seminars over the course of his fifteen year tenure. (T. 
pp. 110-26.) It is readily apparent from the content of these 
seminars that the seminars were intended to instruct management 
personnel on dealing with employees covered by the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, and not to teach generally applicable 
principles for the discipline of all Kennecott employees. (T. pp. 
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412-14.) Consistent treatment of union workers was a repeated 
theme throughout the management seminars. (T. p. 413.) The 
seminars taught tools for implementing the terms of the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement.4 For example, Sorenson testified extensively 
about a manual distributed at a management training seminar at 
Copperton.5 (Ex. 5.) Prominently placed in the pocket of the 
training manual was a complete copy of the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement. (T. p. 412.) A principal section of the manual was 
dedicated to Discipline and Counseling. (T. p. 413.) That section 
contained a disciplinary checklist specifically harmonized with the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement and designed with the objective of 
providing consistent discipline according to the terms of the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement. (T. p.413.) The manual also 
discussed the Justice and Dignity requirement, a term drawn 
directly from the Collective Bargaining Agreement and not appearing 
in any document applying to management employees. (T. p. 413-14.) 
Finally, the training manual discussed participation in the 
Sorenson argues that his understanding of progressive 
discipline as taught during the various seminars was a singular 
system applicable to all employees, i.e., there was "no distinction 
made that progressive discipline was limited in application to 
hourly and union employees." Appellant's Brief at 10. This 
assertion is inconsistent, however, with his recognition that he 
was not entitled to progressive discipline as applicable to hourly 
workers. Appellant's Brief at 30-31. 
5
 Sorenson also testified extensively and in meticulous 
detail concerning the content of the seminar, attendance at the 
seminar, and discussions held during the seminar. However, he 
later recanted the entirety of that testimony and admitted that he 
had never actually attended the seminar, although he did receive 
and review the manual distributed at the seminar. (Sorenson depo. 
pp. 32-39; T. pp. 398-411.) 
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grievance procedure. (T. p. 414.) Grievance procedures were 
applicable solely to union-represented employees; Sorenson conceded 
that there was no grievance procedure available to any salaried 
employee. (T. p. 43 8.) 
Although Sorenson argues that Kennecott's course of 
conduct supports his claim of an implied-in-fact employment 
contract, Sorenson's own post-seminar conduct demonstrates that the 
seminar discussions did not address how to handle performance 
problems with salaried staff. After attending several training 
seminars at which progressive discipline was discussed, Sorenson 
participated in mid-level management discussions revolving around 
questions of how to deal with Ray Stireman and Bob Chesley, two 
salaried supervisors experiencing performance problems. (T. pp. 
419-20.) Sorenson described the content of these discussions with 
phrases such as "hit upon an idea" and arriving at a "new creative 
way to handle" these disciplinary situations. (Sorenson depo. pp. 
51-52; T. pp. 431-32.) There was no precedent or directive to 
guide the discipline of supervisory personnel. Apparently, the 
provisions of progressive discipline which Sorenson claimed to 
apply to all employees, including salaried management employees, 
were given short shrift in these discussions. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE TESTIMONY OF THE 
WITNESSES. 
Sorenson complains that the trial court failed to 
properly consider the testimony regarding progressive discipline as 
constituting a term and condition of his employment with Kennecott. 
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Essentially, Sorenson complains that the trial court did not give 
sufficient weight and credibility to Jerry Hansen's testimony on 
this issue. In ruling on a Rule 41(b) motion for dismissal, the 
trial court may make assessments of credibility and determine, in 
its discretion, what weight to assign a witness's testimony. 
Lemon, 735 P.2d at 60; Wessel, 711 P.2d at 252. Sorenson must 
demonstrate to this Court that the trial court's evaluation of the 
evidence was an abuse of discretion. Several episodes in the 
record illustrate that there are flaws in both Sorenson's and 
Hansen's credibility, and demonstrate the proper weight to assign 
their testimony. 
Sorenson banked heavily on Jerry Hansen's testimony to 
establish the practice of progressive discipline at Kennecott. On 
direct examination, Hansen testified at length regarding his 
understanding of progressive discipline. (T. pp. 533-96.) His 
testimony emphasized his teaching in a series of repetitive 
management training seminars from 1975 through 1981, and suggested 
the content of those seminars provided for the application of a 
rigid system of progressive discipline which applied equally to 
employees governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreement as well 
as supervisory personnel. This system required informal 
counseling, verbal and written warnings, suspension and a hearing 
before termination. But the content of the seminars was not 
directed to disciplining supervisors but rather was focused on 
hourly employees. For instance, the application of the hot stove 
rule (e.g., anyone who touches the stove will be burned) was 
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illustrated by references to actual grievances involving the union 
work force. (T. p. 492) The seminar materials show the same 
emphasis - - foremen applying discipline to hourly employees (T. 
p. 493) . There were no statements, no illustrations, no context 
from which it can be established that the seminar was intended to 
address the issue of the discipline of supervisors. Further, when 
his definition of progressive discipline was probed on cross 
examination, Hansen's testimony described a system of progressive 
discipline with highly elastic parameters. (T. pp. 585-95.) 
Moreover, the pivotal element of Hansen's testimony was that the 
range of protections, such as the stepped grievance process, 
arbitration, reinstatement, record expungement, union 
representation, and appeal, central to the concept of progressive 
discipline and which are embodied in the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, were unequivocally unavailable and not applicable to 
supervisory personnel. (T. pp. 594-95.) Significantly, Hansen 
stated that he did not have authority to create new policy or to 
bind Kennecott. (T. p. 590.) 
Although Sorenson also testified in detail concerning his 
subjective understanding of Kennecott's practice of progressive 
discipline, Sorenson's credibility was highly suspect. The trial 
court was confronted with evidence that Sorenson had testified in 
great detail and at great length as to the content, hours, and 
discussions held at a particular management training seminar. 
(Sorenson depo. pp. 32-39; T. pp. 398-411.) However, when 
counsel's questions became pointed, Sorenson retreated and stated 
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that he had forgotten that he had not attended that particular 
training session. (T. p. 411.) Both Sorenson's and Hansen's 
testimony regarding other matters was also often directly 
contradicted by plaintiff's exhibits and by the testimony of 
Stewart Smith, former smelter manager. (Smith depo. pp. 19, 31, 
38; Ex. 127, 129.) Sorenson testified that the start-up of the 
anode casting plant went "very, very well" and had been a great 
success. (T. pp. 81, 87-89.) On direct examination Hansen 
testified similarly. This testimony was contradicted by two 
memoranda singularly addressing anode plant operations during the 
period in which the anode casting plant was supervised by Sorenson. 
(Ex. 127, 129.) These memoranda articulate numerous critical 
problems with the anode plant operations and illustrate that many 
of the failings of the anode plant had been ongoing for some time. 
On cross examination Hansen admitted that at one time the problems 
at the filter plant and Stewart Smith's dissatisfaction were of 
sufficient magnitude, that Stewart Smith removed all of Hansen's 
responsibility for the filter plant. (T. p. 617.) 
Although Sorenson made general denials that he had ever 
been informed of his performance deficiencies, Sorenson's own 
testimony contradicted the notion that all was rosy with his 
performance. (T. p. 185.) Sorenson admitted that while at the 
smelter he received a less than satisfactory performance review, 
which review when challenged was reaffirmed by Stewart Smith. He 
also received direct criticism of his performance by both David 
George, his direct supervisor, as well as Stewart Smith himself. 
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While at the concentrator, Sorenson testified he recognized Rod 
Davey's and Bill Strickland's disappointment and dissatisfaction 
with the secondary crushing operations under Sorenson's 
supervision. (T. pp. 316-17.) He acknowledged that he had 
numerous discussions with Gary Jungenburg about the condition of 
the plant, and that Chris Robison told him that Davey and 
Strickland felt sufficiently strongly about the affairs at the 
concentrator that some people could lose their jobs. (T. p. 330.) 
But yet, amazingly, Sorenson's testimony was that his performance 
at the concentrator had not been criticized (T. p. 82.) Sorenson 
also gave conflicting explanations regarding his preparation of 
Exhibit 17, a memorandum to Gary Jungenburg discussing cleanup in 
the crusher area and dated December 6, 1988. (T. p. 322-24.) This 
memorandum was prepared at approximately the same time Davey and 
Strickland expressed their dissatisfaction to Sorenson with his 
performance. (T. p. 322.) When his testimony did not coincide 
with the date on the memo his explanation was that he back-dated 
it. (T. pp. 322-24.) 
Sorenson suggests that Jerry Hansen was his supervisor 
for extended periods of time, and therefore should be familiar with 
his performance level. (Appellant's Brief pp. 13, 46.) This 
testimony was contradicted by Stewart Smith, who testified that 
while Sorenson may have reported operationally to Jerry Hansen at 
certain times, Sorenson worked under the daily and administrative 
supervision of David George, technical group superintendent, during 
most times critical to this lawsuit, the times during which 
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Sorenson's failing performance was directly at issue. (Smith depo. 
pp. 20-21.) Sorenson reported directly to Hansen only during a 
short period while the plant was idle and Jerry Hansen was acting 
plant manager. Other than that brief period of time, Sorenson was 
assigned to the technical department, while Hansen worked in the 
maintenance or operations departments. (See supra, note 2.) 
Confronted by directly conflicting testimony, the trial 
court was obliged to make credibility and weight assessments to 
guide its ruling on Kennecott's Rule 41(b) motion. The trial court 
had before it the testimony of the plaintiff, Kelly Sorenson. The 
trial court also had the testimony of former employee, Jerry 
Hansen, who had "expressed total disappointment in his removal" 
from a senior management position and reassignment as an engineer. 
(Smith depo. p. 27.) Finally, the court had the testimony of 
Stewart Smith, a former high level Kennecott official and smelter 
plant manager. Smith certainly had no motivation to color his 
testimony in favor of Kennecott. Kennecott fired Smith without any 
stated reason, after only three years at Kennecott. (Smith depo. 
p. 44.) These facts, coupled with the inconsistencies and 
inaccuracies of Sorenson's and Hansen's testimony, prevent Sorenson 
from meeting his burden before this Court of establishing that the 
trial court abused its discretion in its weight and credibility 
assessments of the witnesses who testified as to progressive 
discipline. 
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III. THE COURT OF APPEALS MAY ALTERNATIVELY AFFIRM THE 
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT DEFENDANT 
MET THE TERMS OF ANY IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT WITH 
PLAINTIFF. 
A. If Plaintiff Proved Any Terms of an 
Implied-in-fact Contract, He Showed 
Only That He Was Entitled to Notice 
of Unsatisfactory Performance. 
Although defendant Kennecott did not present its case to 
the trial court, having successfully brought a Rule 41(b) motion 
for dismissal, there is adequate evidence in the record to affirm 
the decision of the trial court on the alternative ground that 
Sorenson received notice of his unsatisfactory performance prior to 
his termination. The Court of Appeals may affirm the trial court's 
decision on any reasonable ground, even if not relied upon by the 
trial court. Kenyon v. Regan, 826 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah App. 1992). 
"Thus, if an argument made for the first time on appeal will result 
in affirmance, the argument will be considered" by the Court of 
Appeals. State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah App. 1991). 
Progressive discipline, as interpreted and practiced by 
Kennecott, does not mean a lock-step disciplinary approach. For 
example, a worker need not receive a certain number of verbal 
warnings prior to receiving a written warning, or a certain number 
of written warnings prior to suspension or termination. (T. p. 
586.) Jerry Hansen offered extensive testimony concerning 
Kennecott's practice of progressive discipline. Hansen testified 
that progressive discipline did not necessarily mean that one was 
always entitled to a verbal warning. (T. pp. 586-87.) Hansen 
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further stated that a written warning would not necessarily be 
preceded by a verbal warning, (T. pp. 586, 588.) Hansen further 
testified that progressive discipline might mean that discipline 
was initiated at the time off stage, bypassing both written and 
verbal warnings. (T. p. 586.) Finally, Hansen testified that 
Kennecott's practice of progressive discipline would allow for the 
discharge of a salaried employee who had received neither a verbal 
warning, written warning or suspension prior to termination. (T. 
p. 586.) Hansen described a panoply of rights applicable to union-
represented employees subjected to discipline. Hansen stated that 
not one of those rights was applicable to salaried employees. (T. 
pp. 594-95.) 
Kennecott practiced progressive discipline with its 
union-represented employees as a means of implementation of and 
adherence to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. In contrast, 
progressive discipline was applied to salaried employees, not as a 
matter of contract, but as a good management technique. (Smith 
depo. p. 46.) Jerry Hansen conceded that as a supervisor he viewed 
the application of progressive discipline differently for salaried 
and union-represented employees. (T. p. 596.) This difference is 
exhibited in Hansen's own experience of demotion without preceding 
discipline, as well as the terminations of Tracy Johnson and 
Stewart Smith. 
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B. Kennecott Provided Sorenson Adequate 
Notice of Performance Deficiencies 
Prior to Termination. 
Sorenson's own testimony and trial exhibits demonstrate 
that he had a significant history of counseling and other 
communications prior to termination. In fact, Sorenson had been 
previously demoted by two grades, and had been removed from his 
position in the anode casting plant for inadequate performance, 
(T. p. 369; Smith depo. p. 21.) During the period preceding his 
removal, Sorenson received verbal counseling from Stewart Smith, 
plant manager, concerning his performance in the anode casting 
plant. (Smith depo. pp. 19, 31, 3 8.) Moreover, Sorenson became 
aware of management's dissatisfaction with his performance through 
written memoranda from Stewart Smith to Jerry Hansen and David 
George discussing operations at the anode plant, operations for 
which Sorenson was directly responsible. (Ex. 127, 129.) 
Sorenson's immediate supervisor in the anode casting 
plant, David George, criticized Sorenson's performance on several 
occasions. Sorenson testified that George criticized him when he 
failed to report promptly after his troubleshooting trip to Chile. 
(T. p. 92.) Sorenson also received a G- performance rating for 
19 87 while he was under the supervision of David George. (T. p. 
448.) At about that same time, George gave Sorenson a detailed 
letter articulating Sorenson's performance problems and 
deficiencies in the anode plant. (Smith depo. p. 32.) 
Sorenson began his final assignment at Kennecott with a 
performance admonition. When Stewart Smith called Sorenson into 
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his office to hasten Sorenson's transfer, Smith told Sorenson that 
the transfer was an opportunity for Sorenson to "redeem" himself 
from past performance deficiencies and that this was his "last 
chance." (Smith depo. pp. 22, 28.) Despite this unambiguous 
declaration, Sorenson did not effect significant improvement at the 
concentrator plant. Sorenson testified that Rod Davey and Bill 
Strickland communicated their disappointment in the condition of 
the secondary crushing area to him during their plant tour in 
December 1988. (T. p. 307.) Sorenson also testified that Gary 
Jungenburg identified numerous problems in the concentrator plant 
and told Sorenson what to do about them. (T. pp. 319-20, 326.) 
Sorenson's supervisor, Chris Robison, went so far as to tell 
Sorenson that the plant condition was so poor that "some people 
could lose their jobs." (T. p. 330.) 
In sum, even though Sorenson had no contractual 
entitlement to progressive discipline, he received the type of 
communication normally made to Kennecott salaried employees 
regarding performance issues. Sorenson was on notice of his 
deficient performance by virtue of extensive counseling and written 
communications, including his formal annual performance evaluation 
conducted by David George. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals may 
affirm the decision of the trial court on the grounds that, even if 
Sorenson did benefit from an implied-in-fact contract of 
employment, Sorenson received the progressive discipline impliedly 
required by that contract. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly dismissed Sorenson's amended 
complaint under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Sorenson did not prove an implied-in-fact contract for continued 
employment; neither the superseded code of conduct, Kennecott's 
practice of progressive discipline nor the management training 
courses supported Sorenson's claim. Alternatively, the Court of 
Appeals may affirm the trial court's judgment on the grounds that 
Sorenson received progressive discipline through the numerous 
verbal and written warnings of his inadequate job performance. The 
court also properly exercised its discretion under Rule 41(b) in 
assessing weight and credibility of the trial witnesses. 
Kennecott asks the Court to affirm the judgment and 
decision of the trial court in all respects and to award its costs 
on appeal as provided by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 34. 
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